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The Overture to a Full (and Unfinished) Symphony1 
Roger A. Lohmann 
 
Charles Lindblom’s “disjointed incrementalism” and the 1959 article in PAR  
with that famous (some might argue infamous) title (The Science of Muddling 
Through) is a study in contrasts at the celebration of its first half-century: 
Incrementalism, or strategic choice, is arguably one of the 2-3 most important 
American contributions to the understanding of public choice in the 20th century – 
replete with implications for the study and practice of administration, planning, 
policy, organizations. Yet in Lindblom’s famous 1959 article, the basic idea was 
wrapped in a dense, almost impenetrable, blanket of words which students required 
to read it may rightfully regard more as punishment than enlightenment. 
The 1959 article is the work of a youthful scholar: An overture full of promise of 
things to come, and yet an undisciplined presentation tending toward the obtuse. 
The concept of incrementalism which it presents, fortunately survived the 
presentation and became increasingly clear in Lindblom’s later publications. But 
what of that terrible, arcane adjective “disjointed”? Without joints? Disconnected? 
Incoherent? What exactly was the point of that adjective, anyway? With or without 
its joints, the concepts of the increment and of incremental change are immediately 
(and crystal) clear to anyone who has ever experienced organizational decision 
making and change, whether or not they think it a good way of doing things. 
Lindblom's increments offer a participants-eye view of history, as he himself 
showed in The Intelligence of Democracy (1965). Even revolutions are not cut from 
the whole cloth (or blueprints or plans) their makers would have us see, nor do they 
emerge transcendently from the minds of revolutionaries. Even the most carefully 
planned revolutions must unfold incrementally in the day-to-day judgements, 
decisions and at times rash actions of their makers, with full measures of 
information scarcity, doubt, uncertainty, hesitant decision making. Lenin’s fateful 
decision to allow the local Soviet to “execute” the Czar’s entire household unloosed a 
string of fateful choices each of which was partial in scope, serial in order and 
remedial in effect, in ways Lindblom’s model clarified in A Strategy of Decision 
(1963). The very latest permutation of these choices was only evident quite recently 
in the decision by the Russian Orthodox Church to finally allow the burial of the 
identified skeletal remains of the Czar’s family and the last-minute decision of 
President Yeltsen to attend the ceremony in hopes of shoring up his own sagging 
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political agenda. So it is, as Lindblom showed us as clearly as anyone ever has, that 
strategic choice seeks to spell out the distinctive logic which political decision-
makers employ to reconcile the historical heritage they have been left with the 
future legacy they seek to leave behind within the constraints of an all-too-real 
present. Rene Descartes several centuries earlier had shown us the more idealized 
version of how god-like creatures in full command of their facts and knowledge 
should do it and Yeheskel Dror (1963) was among the chorus of many who allowed 
that even if we can't do it Descartes’ way, we owe it to him (or the model of science 
he instituted) to try. 
But why was Lindblom’s 1959 argument so obtuse, anyway? It may just have 
been relative youth and scholarly innocence. More likely, it was because in the 
1950’s an expression as radical as this one was hemmed in on all sides by a world 
unwilling to acknowledge, or even allow full expression of any of his essential 
points. Just a year or two after the death of the infamous Senator from Wisconsin 
and in a nation already deeply locked in the grip of the cold war, at the height of the 
Beaver Cleaver conventionality of popular culture, and the corporate world of 
organization man, how could one accurately confront a notion of change as radical 
as this and yet be clear about it?  
To be clear about change at all was to risk provoking the forces of 
conventionality and the status quo on the right, and just as surely not to speak of 
change in the banal clichés of the revolutionary cant of the left also possessed its 
risks. Later in the 1960's as the winds of political fashion shifted, Lindblom's 
position was viewed very differently.  Because of its careful, controlled, limited 
presentation, numerous critics throughout the very different 1960’s and later, 
mistook the whole argument as an expression of conservative ideology; and a 
commitment to the status quo.  
Yet the model itself was (and is) anything but conservative: It was an offshoot of 
the Deweyan embrace of a model of continuous change through inquiry in an age 
when Dewey went from a national icon to the dungeon of the all but forgotten. It 
was a theory of bourgeois revolution for social science and practice disciplines 
lacking any firm sense of history; a theory of practical paradigm shifts in policy fully 
equal to Thomas Kuhn's later model of paradigm shifts in science. 
Although Lindblom himself did much to confront and counter the mistaken ideas 
about incrementalism which appeared in later publications, and to clarify the 
notion that changing circumstances always occur within changing contexts, one still 
hears many of them repeated today; particularly the false contrast of incremental 
change with the contextless  (and largely fictional) “large-scale planned change”. 
America in the 1950’s may not be the full explanation. It might also have been 
that Lindblom felt hemmed in at the time by the dominance of political behaviorism 
in which there was little place for mind or mental activity. Descartes and the 
resulting synoptic rationality of economics and politics which Lindblom so 
brilliantly dissected just four years later in A Strategy of Decision were still firmly 
in the driver's seat in 1959. And there may, of course, be other explanations as well.  
Whatever the reasons, social and political theory of a lasting kind requires a 
kind of maturity, experience and wisdom of perspective which are largely lacking in 
the 1959 article, but which Lindblom supplied in abundance in his later work. 
Nonetheless, the PAR article will continue to be important as the “announcement” 
of a genuinely novel and important approach to strategic choice or public decisions 
which only reached mature expression in later publications. 
More's the pity for those who are familiar with incrementalism, or strategic 
choice, only through its 1959 overture in PAR, and who have yet to embrace the full 
symphonic resolution of its themes to be found throughout Lindblom’s oeuvre: The 
Intelligence of Democracy  (1965), A Strategy of Decision  (1963),  The Policy-making 
Process (1968), Politics and Markets  (1977), “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through” 
(1979), Usable Knowledge  (1979), Inquiry and Change (1990), and assorted other 
contributions.  
These later works develop more fully, refine and elaborate an elegant, on-the-
mark, and ultimately practical theory of strategic choice which allows a public 
administrative practice which is richer, deeper and far more self-aware today than 
it was 50 years ago when the overture was first heard. 
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